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Abstract
A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex 
(MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility 
transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department 
of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC.  This accomplishment supported excellence in 
operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste 
requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport 
costs; and making facility operations more efficient.  
The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 
radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers.  Previously, the TSD 
did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive 
and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums.  Previous practice was to package the 
waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for 
transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations.  This practice allowed operations 
to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations 
friendly.  An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding 
this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. 
In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were 
used effectively to directly support excellence in operations.  Several factors contributed to the 
success of MFC’s effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two 
practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities.
1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to 
better integrate nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements.  MFC’s efforts 
illustrate that utilizing the requirements of other disciplines, beyond nuclear safety, can 
provide an efficient process.  Analyzing current processes to find better ways of 
meeting the requirements of multiple disciplines within a safety basis can lead to a 
more cost-effective, streamlined process. 
2) Incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the MFC TSD was efficient because safety 
analysts utilized a transportation plan that provided analysis that could also be used for 
the change to the TSD addendum.  In addition, because the plan they used had already 
been approved and was in use by the Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) at the INL, 
justification for the change to the TSD was more compelling.  MFC safety analysts 
proved that streamlining a process can be made more feasible by drawing from analysis 
that has already been completed.
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1. Background 
In January 2006 the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) 
issued an addendum1 to the “MFC Transportation Safety Document”2 (TSD) in response to a 
potentially inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA) declaration.  The addendum replaced the 
requirements identified in the TSD for transfers of Hazard Category (HC)-3 or greater quantities 
of radioactive material using non-Department of Transportation (DOT) compliant packages.  It 
approved the transfer of cask configurations that appeared on an approved cask list.  It also 
approved the transfers of HC-3 or greater quantities of radioactive material using non-DOT 
compliant packages in accordance with configurations and parameters given in Appendix A of 
the addendum.  The addendum noted that per PLN-2005, now NS-18308,3 “MFC Work Plan for 
Safety Basis Upgrade,” the TSD would be upgraded to fully resolve the unresolved safety 
question (USQ).  Until the upgraded TSD was approved, the TSD addendum would provide the 
controls needed to allow transportation activities to continue. 
Later in 2006, several issues were revised in the addendum.  One improvement in particular 
provided for a more efficient transportation packaging process.  Previously, the MFC TSD 
addendum did not include the capability to transfer greater-than-HC-3 waste using DOT Type A 
drums.  This proved a problem for facilities at MFC that were packaging waste to send to Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which requires the use of Type A drums for transfer of waste.  In 
order to use the Type A drums, MFC facilities were forced to dilute the waste materials, reducing 
the waste levels to less-than-HC-3 quantities.  This reduced drum waste accumulations, keeping 
the quantities less-than-HC-3, which allowed the facilities to continue to use the Type A drums.  
Though this practice allowed operations to proceed, it was inefficient.  It resulted in drums being 
loaded to less than the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost 
effective or operations friendly. To correct this, MFC nuclear safety personnel chose to modify 
the TSD addendum to gain DOE-ID approval for using DOT Type A drums for greater-than-HC-
3 quantities.  They worked to integrate nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements to 
help the TSD addendum more effectively support operations. 
To document the specific operational parameters necessary to safely transport the waste, the INL 
created Engineering Design File (EDF)-6981,4 a supporting reference document to the TSD 
addendum.  The EDF noted that the proposed payload/container configuration for DOT Type A 
drums at MFC met the parameters and limits already in use in other similar approved MFC inter-
facility transfers of HC-3 or greater, i.e., transfers in PLN-1851, “Transport Plan for the Transfer 
of Waste Containers between RWMC and INTEC, and RWMC and MFC.”5  The proposed 
payload configuration for DOT Type A drums at MFC incorporated the same parameters and 
administrative limit values already approved in PLN-1851 for the transfer of CH-TRU waste 
between INL facilities.  According to EDF-6981, “The analysis contained in PLN-1851, 
demonstrates that the stated transport controls, including TSRs, provide equivalent safety to 
DOT and NRC requirements.”  By referencing a plan already approved and in use at the INL, 
MFC was better able to justify the addition of DOT Type A drums to the TSD. 
DOE-ID reviewed and approved the revised safety basis addendum in October 2006, allowing 
the desired inter-facility transfers of HC-3, contact handled (CH)-transuranic (TRU) waste 
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quantities in DOT Type A drums.  This revision allowed for a more cost-effective, streamlined 
process for facility operations at MFC.   
2. Process of Revising the TSD Addendum 
The method that MFC used to add DOT Type A drums to the TSD addendum provides a process 
that can be applied to future similar modifications.  Two concepts are especially worthwhile and 
applicable to any facility looking to modify their safety basis to make their work process more 
efficient.
1. The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to 
better integrate nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements.  Nuclear safety was 
concerned with keeping transportation within the bounds of transportation requirements 
and cask requirements, while WIPP WAC was concerned with keeping packaging and 
waste amounts within the required waste limits.  These requirements did not always 
clearly mesh.  By considering the requirements and limits all together, safety analysts 
were able to create a streamlined process that satisfies the nuclear safety basis 
requirements, as well as WIPP WAC waste limits.  The improved process is not only 
more efficient than the previous process, but also less costly.
MFC’s efforts prove that understanding the requirements of other disciplines, beyond 
nuclear safety, can provide for a more efficient processes.  Analyzing current processes to 
find better ways of meeting the requirements of several disciplines can lead to a more 
cost-effective, streamlined process. 
2. Incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the MFC TSD took less time and effort than 
expected because safety analysts found a transportation plan, PLN-1851, which provided 
analysis that could also be used for the change to the TSD.  Because the PLN had already 
been approved and was in use by the Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP), MFC was able to 
justify the addition of the DOT Type A configuration to the safety basis.
MFC learned that streamlining a process can be made more feasible by considering 
analysis that has already been completed.  The safety analysis process can be made easier 
by taking advantage of work that has already been done.  This is extremely effective 
when the analysis being used is already approved and in use, since this helps to validate 
the new change. 
The next several sections of this paper will more fully detail the two concepts from above by 
describing the process MFC went through to obtain approval of the revised TSD addendum. 
3. Integrated Approach 
An integrated approach was essential for operational excellence at MFC and required an intimate 
knowledge of the WIPP WAC and nuclear safety TSD requirements.  The WIPP WAC provided 
the basis for drum requirements, including contents, sizes, vent, gasket material, and closure 
requirements.  The TSD provided the basis for type of transport vehicle, transfer route, speed of 
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the transport, and nuclear safety analysis. The TSD had to consider measures to reduce a 
potential radioactive material release, to reduce direct radiation exposure, and to maintain 
criticality safety during transportation.  An integrated approach ensured that the basic 
requirements of shipping were covered under the TSD, and acceptance of the nuclear operations 
waste was completed per the WAC of the disposal facility.
Several waste requirements were considered in this process.  For example, the Pu-239 fissile 
grams equivalent (FGE) for nuclear criticality had to be < 200 grams/55 drum.  This was to 
ensure the container would not have the capability to undergo a nuclear criticality.  WIPP also 
required that the calculation included two times the measurement error.   
Additionally, from a waste requirements stand point, the Pu-239 Equivalent activity (PE-Ci) had 
to be 80 PE-Ci per 55-gallon drum.  This was used to control radiation exposure to workers 
handling the drum during storage, transportation, and disposal operations.  The calculation 
documented that each container on the shipment was less than 80 grams of Pu-239 equivalent 
activity, which was documented using radionuclide-specific weighting factors.  The majority of 
radionuclides generated/dealt with at MFC have a weighting factor of 1.0 to 1.1. The calculation 
used is: 
                  K 
 Pu-239 FGE = Ai /WFi 
            i = 1 
where the radionuclide gram quantity (Ai) is divided by the weighting factor (WFi) for 
radionuclides found in Appendix B of the current WIPP WAC for 13 common transuranic 
radionuclides.  Because Am-241 and Pu-239 are the usual transuranic radionuclides at MFC, and 
have a weighting factor of 1.0, the FGE is easy to calculate, sum, and document.  (Note: this 
calculation requires consideration of the total measurement uncertainty to be expressed in terms 
of one standard deviation for each drum of waste.) 
The previous two examples illustrated waste requirements considered during the revision.  The 
last example is a nuclear safety requirement that had to be integrated with the waste 
requirements.  For this requirement, the material at risk (MAR) was used to calculate an accident 
analysis for exposure to personnel in a transportation accident from a total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE) without controls.  The TEDE is the sum of the deep-dose equivalent (for 
external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures).  The 
deep-dose equivalent for external exposures is the amount of energy of radiation absorbed in 
matter, such as a person. The committed dose equivalent is the dose equivalent to organs or 
tissues of reference that an individual would receive from an intake of radioactive material 
during the 50-year period following the intake.  As this paper will discuss in section 4.1, 
PLN-1851 provided the analysis for the exposure to personnel, and resulted in an MFC 
transportation control in which the transportation route from the outside the MFC fence is 
controlled such that members of the public are prevented from approaching the loaded waste 
payload transport vehicle any closer than 400 meters.   
In the end, integrating requirements from the container and container transfer with WIPP WAC 
and TSD Nuclear Safety requirements resulted in a TSD addendum that adequately meets the 
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requirements of several different disciplines, while also providing a process that adequately 
supports operations.
4. Utilization of Approved Analysis 
4.1 Analysis of Drum Transport 
MFC safety analysts addressed several factors when adding the DOT Type A drums to the TSD 
addendum, including weight limits, removable surface contamination and ALARA, identification 
and labeling, physical form, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) TRU waste.
An additional factor that required special consideration was MAR.  To save time and effort, the 
safety analysts used MAR analysis from PLN-1851. 
As documented in EDF-6981, the transportation of the DOT Type A drum at MFC is bounded by 
analysis of a multiple waste container breach per PLN-1851, Section 6.4, “Accident and Dose 
Consequence Analysis.” This section estimates the release of radioactive material from an 
accident involving the transport of 32, 55-gallon waste drums, or two 16-drum equivalent boxes.  
The dose calculations assume that the containers are loaded with 115.2 Ci (1,852 g) Pu-239 Ci 
equivalent per truckload.  Section 6.4.2 compares the results of the estimated dose consequences 
to the risk evaluation guidelines (ref. Table 1).
Table 1. Comparison of Does Consequences to Evaluation Guidelines.  
Accident Frequency  
(without 
controls) 
Co-located 
Worker at 100 
m (TEDE) a
(rem) 
Public at  
400 m  
(TEDE)  
(rem) 
Facility and 
Co-located 
Worker 
Evaluation 
Guidelines 
(rem) 
Public 
Evaluation 
Guidelines  
(rem) 
Multiple waste 
container 
breach  
Anticipated  1.7E+00  3.5E-01  5.0E+00  5.0E-01  
Multiple waste 
container fire  
Unlikely  3.5E+00  7.4E-01  2.5E+01  5.0E+00  
a. TEDE = Total effective dose equivalent.  
All estimates fall below public evaluation guidelines, except the multiple container fire dose 
consequence to the public.  The limit for the public evaluation guidelines is 0.5 rem, yet the 
estimated dose consequence at 400 meters is 0.74 rem.  Thus a TSR was required to prevent 
members of the public from approaching a shipment within 400 meters of the flatbed truck.  
Analysts at MFC needed to determine if the analysis given in PLN-1851 could also be applied to 
the transfer of DOT Type A drums at MFC.  To determine if the amount of CH-TRU waste used 
in the scenario from PLN-1851 was greater than or equal to the amount of CH-TRU waste 
transported to WIPP, they reviewed material profiles and shipping records to identify the 
historical maximum CH-TRU WIPP payloads.  Table 2 shows the results and highlights the 
maximum amounts of CH-TRU material transferred to WIPP. 
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Table 2. Watts, Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent and Pu-239 Equivalent Activity (PE-Ci). 
Container  
Gross
Weight 
(pounds) 
mR/hr 
@
contact
Total 
235U
(grams) 
Total Pu 
(grams) Total Ci 
Thermal 
Watts
Pu-239
FGE PE-Ci
1 169 5 0.00E+00 6.38E+00 7.05E+00 1.76E-02 5.37E+00 3.38E-01 
2 165 15 0.00E+00 5.32E+00 5.86E+00 1.47E-02 4.46E+00 2.81E-01 
3 205 20 2.32E+01 9.60E+00 8.03E+00 2.60E-02 2.34E+01 1.47E+00 
4 160 7 4.50E-01 4.70E+00 4.55E+00 1.37E-02 4.25E+00 2.67E-01 
5 179 40 1.85E+01 1.04E+01 8.07E+00 2.75E-02 2.79E+01 1.75E+00 
6 160 60 1.24E-02 2.26E+00 2.32E+00 3.83E-02 1.91E+00 1.20E-01 
7 150 20 0.00E+00 3.05E+00 2.57E+00 3.29E-02 2.55E+00 1.60E-01 
8 136 80 0.00E+00 4.04E-02 1.07E+00 3.62E-02 4.13E-01 2.59E-02 
9 162 5 0.00E+00 4.31E+00 1.30E+00 4.26E-02 4.20E+00 2.64E-01 
10 143 110 0.00E+00 1.29E+01 2.01E+00 4.04E-02 1.25E+01 7.86E-01 
11 127 20 0.00E+00 6.85E+00 1.76E+00 3.90E-02 6.45E+00 4.06E-01 
12 134 150 0.00E+00 8.40E-01 7.27E-01 2.45E-02 7.08E-01 4.45E-02 
13 129 10 0.00E+00 2.80E-01 1.74E-02 5.40E-04 2.79E-01 1.75E-02 
14 169 120 9.60E-01 2.32E+00 1.31E+00 4.26E-02 2.91E+00 1.83E-01 
Analysts concluded that none of the CH-TRU payloads transferred to WIPP had ever exceeded 
the 115.2 Ci (1,852 g) Pu-239 Ci equivalency used to calculate the analysis in PLN-1851. Thus 
they concluded that the analysis in PLN-1851 was adequate to also apply to the transfer of 
CH-TRU waste in DOT Type A drums at MFC.   
MFC safety analysts incorporated the conclusion from PLN-1851 (that the dose consequences to 
the public are below evaluation guidelines provided that public access to the transportation route 
is controlled) by including multiple configuration parameters in the addendum.  These included 
statements such as, “The transport route, including pickup and delivery, will follow the direct 
route between facilities on paved roads at MFC within the property protected area,” and 
“Transfers to and from TREAT for the movement of CH-TRU drums shall be identified and 
controlled such that members of the public are prevented from approaching the loaded waste 
container transport vehicle any closer than 400 m (1,312 ft).” 
In the section where PLN-1851 evaluated payload containers, it concluded that “no safety-
significant structure, system, and components (SSCs) are necessary for the waste container 
transport activity to maintain the consequences to the worker and the co-located worker below 
evaluation guidelines for any analyzed hazards and accidents” (Section 6.5.1).  Thus EDF-6981 
also described the payload containers used for the transport of CH-TRU waste at MFC, but went 
on to cite PLN-1851 to support the exclusion of safety-significant SSCs for the waste container 
transport activities. 
By incorporating the analysis from PLN-1851, as well as the resultant TSR, into the analysis 
performed for DOT Type A drums at MFC, safety analysts were able to justify the inclusion of 
the Type A drums in the MFC TSD and minimize the amount of analysis that needed to be 
performed.  The fact that PLN-1851 had already been approved and was in use by ICP helped 
strengthen the proposal for the use of DOT Type A drums at MFC. 
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4.2  Criticality 
Criticality was another area where MFC analysts were able to use analysis from PLN-1851.  
Analysis of fissile loading was given in the PLN-1851, which states that each shipment 
(truckload) must be limited to a maximum of 32 drums (Appendix B, B.2.1.1) with the following 
load limits: 
x Load limit of  1,500 g of Pu-239 fissile gram equivalency (FGE) per truckload 
(TSR, PLN-1851, Section 7, 2a). 
This limit given is much higher than any amount of TRU-CH material that would be transported 
at MFC.  Transport of TRU-CH waste at MFC must meet the WIPP criticality safety requirement 
of:
x Fissile loading of 200 g of Pu-239 FGE per waste container (EDF-6981, Section 8). 
This limit falls within the limit given in PLN-1851, making the criticality analysis performed in 
PLN-1851 also valid for the MFC TSD.  PLN-1851, Appendix B, includes an inadvertent 
criticality section, which states: “A criticality safety evaluation that addresses storage of waste 
drums containing fissile material at the RWMC indicates that criticality in a storage array of 
55-gal drums is not a credible event for waste drums containing up to 380 g of Pu-239 fissile 
gram equivalent (FGE) if the storage array contains no more than 500 drums.  The maximum 
number of drums in any single shipment will be limited operationally to 32 drums, or two 
16-drum-equivalent waste boxes.”  PLN-1851 goes on to conclude: “Criticality safety 
evaluations have been completed supporting the storage of fissile-bearing waste containers. 
These analyses can be applied to support the transport of these waste containers.”
One area that MFC differed from PLN-1851 was for criticality safety during transport.
PLN-1851, Appendix B, documents flooding as a potential initiator of a radioactive material 
release.  To minimize the consequences of a flood, PLN-1851 directs that if flooding is occurring 
or if flooding is forecast to occur within the next six hours, the shipment shall be cancelled.  Yet 
flooding at MFC is estimated as unlikely and the probability of a flood within the MFC fenced 
area resulting in a release of radioactive material is much less because of the number of 
employees in the area who would detect flooding.  EDF-6981 references DSA-001-SW,6 the 
“ANL-W Standardized Documented Safety Analysis,” Section 1.5.3, which notes that locally 
intense rain presents the only natural flood threat to MFC nuclear facilities and flooding is 
unlikely because the dry and porous ground can absorb the moisture.  Because of the short 
distance between MFC facilities and the unlikely probability of flooding, the control from 
PLN-1851 was unnecessary and was not adopted for MFC CH-TRU transports.
Though not all of the critically analysis from PLN-1851 was used for the MFC TSD analysis, 
safety analysts were able to sift through the analysis given to find aspects that could be applied to 
MFC.  Once more, using existing analysis helped to lessen the amount of analysis performed for 
the change to the MFC TSD. 
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5. Conclusions and Summary 
Though this paper is specific to the revision made to the MFC TSD, the methods that were used 
could be applied to other modifications to facility safety basis.  These methods help to support 
excellence in operations in several ways.   
x By integrating requirements from other fields of concern, such as waste requirements, 
safety analysts can help to make processes more efficient and economical.  It’s good to 
evaluate current process to determine if changes to the safety basis can better support 
work in operations, while still meeting all the necessary safety basis requirements.   
x By using completed analysis from an approved process/facility and applying it to a new 
processes/facility, safety analysis can cut down on the amount of new analysis they have 
to complete.  Using analysis that is already approved and in use provides strong evidence 
to support conclusions.
The work at MFC to create and revise the TSD addendum is a good example of these practices.  
It proves that safety analysis can support operations to keep work moving efficiently and better 
meet the goals of everyone involved. 
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